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THE UNION AS TITLE VII PLAINTIFF: AFFIRMATIVE
OBLIGATION TO LITIGATE?*
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 1 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 19642 are integral elements of this nation's
comprehensive labor policy. Although each legislative component
must be construed in accordance with the overall scheme of labor
relations regulation,3 it is clear that the NLRA and Tide VII differ
in their basic foci. The principal aim of the NLRA is to establish
collective bargaining as the mechanism for settlement of industrial
disputes. 4 The core of Title VII, on the contrary, is application of
the antidiscrimination principle to the nation's workplaces.3 In
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organiza-
tion,6 the Supreme Court acknowledged the pervasive reach of the
antidiscrimination principle,7 but held that minority employees who
attempted to bargain separately with their employer on issues of
alleged discrimination were not within the protective sphere of
section 7 concerted activity.8 The Court emphasized the importance
of preserving the orderly operation of the collective bargaining
* Research for this Comment was funded in part by the Pew Memorial Trust,
through the Industrial Research Unit, the Wharton School, University of Pennsyl-
vania.
129 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970 & Supp. V 1976).
242 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(1)-(17) (1970 & Supp. V 1976).
3 "[I]t is a commonplace that we must construe the NLRA in light of the broad
national labor policy of which it is a part." Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 66 (1975) (citation omitted).
4 "Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees
to . . . bargain collectively safeguards commerce . . . by encouraging . . . friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
5 Section 2000e-2(a) (1) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual.., because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin . ...
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
6420 U.S. 50 (1975).
7 "Plainly, national labor policy embodies the principles of nondiscrimination as
a matter of highest priority .... ." Id. 66 (citation omitted).
8 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 7 of the NLRA defines the basic contours
of protected activity. It grants employees "the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for . . . mutual aid
or protection ...... Id.
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process. 9 Emporium Capwell is by no means the only example of
the need for judicial reconciliation of these occasionally conflicting
principles. 10 Westinghouse Electric Corp." provides an opportunity
to examine again the interaction of the two principles through
analysis of union liability-under the duty of fair representation
and under Title VII-for failure to bring Title VII suits against
the employer.
The Westinghouse litigation involved a charge by the Inter-
national Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE)
that the company had violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA 2 by its
refusal to furnish certain information solicited by the union. In
order to understand the significance of the information request, it
is necessary to briefly recount the history of the collective bargain-
ing relationship of the parties.
In 1973, the IUE structured its national negotiations in ac-
cordance with its affirmative action program calling for the total
elimination of all forms of job discrimination.' 3 Pursuant to this
goal, the union requested and received extensive bargaining infor-
mation concerning the distribution of male and female employees
by labor grade. These same statistical compilations subsequently
were utilized in two Title VII lawsuits filed by the IUE against
Westinghouse."4 In 1974, one year into the existing three year con-
tract, the union made an information request similar to the one
answered during the 1973 negotiations. The request specified, inter
alia, employment breakdowns on the basis of race and Spanish sur-
name, and a listing of all discrimination charges and complaints
9 420 U.S. at 69.
10 See generally Roth, The Relationship Between Title VII and the NLRA:
"Getting Our Acts Together" in Race Discrimination Cases, 23 VHL. L. 1rEv. 68
(1977).
"1 No. 6-CA-7680 (NLRB Region 6, Pittsburgh, Pa., filed Feb. 17, 1976).
1229 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (1970). Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees . . . ." Id.
13 Charging Party's Post-Hearing Brief at 6, Westinghouse Electric Corp., No.
6-CA-7680 (NLRB Region 6, Pittsburgh, Pa., filed Feb. 17, 1976). The 1973
effort was not the IUE's first attempt to secure protection against job discrimination
for its members. For example, an antidiscrimination clause was previously incor-
porated into the collective bargaining agreement. Charging Party's Post-Hearing
Brief, id. 3-5, contains a complete history of the union's bargaining position on
antidiscrimination issues, as well as references to previous contractual provisions,
some of which prohibited racial and sexual discrimination, guaranteed equal pay for
equal work, and provided for maternity leaves of absence.
14 Brief on Behalf of Respondent at 15, Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-
CA-7680 (NLRB Region 6, Pittsburgh, Pa., filed Feb. 17, 1976). The union also
caused two other Title VII actions to be brought against Westinghouse. Id.
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filed against Westinghouse. 15 The company objected that such in-
formation was not relevant to collective bargaining, was burdensome
to compile, and appeared to be a discovery vehicle facilitative to
potential discrimination suits against it. Accordingly, it refused to
comply with the union's request. The union filed a complaint with
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the Director of
the Sixth Region charged Westinghouse with violations of sections
8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.11 The union asserted that the
duty of fair representation required it "to establish fair employment
practices that meet the requirements of the Civil Rights Act. The
information . . .requested is . . .necessary . . . [to] fulfill that
duty." 17
Administrative Law Judge Marvin Roth held the company's
reasons for withholding the information insufficient, and ordered
that the information be furnished to the union as requested. Judge
Roth framed the issue as "[w]hether either generally or in the con-
text of this case, maintenance or participation of a union in litigation
against an employer can be a legitimate function of collective bar-
gaining." 18 He observed that the union had "an affirmative duty
to root out discrimination," 19 and concluded that the filing of Title
VII suits for sex or race discrimination constituted a legitimate
function of the union's collective bargaining obligation. Failure to
take any action, Roth noted, "would leave the union open to charges
that it was failing to carry out its responsibilities as bargaining
representative, or [was] becoming a party to discriminatory practices
" 20 Judge Roth thus raised the spectre of union liability for
is Specifically, the union requested a breakdown by race and sex with respect
to (1) labor grade; (2) classification and wage rate; (3) incentive and day work;
(4) seniority; (5) hiring; (6) promotions and upgrades. The union also requested
(7) a list of complaints and charges filed under various fair employment practice
laws; (8) copies of the company's affrmative action program; and (9) work force
analyses. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-CA-7680, slip op. at 2-3 (NLRB
Region 6, Pittsburgh, Pa., Feb. 17, 1976).
1629 U.S.C. §§158(a)(5) & 158(a)(1) (1970). Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed . .. [them]."
Id.
17 Charging Party's Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 13, at 14.
18 Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-CA-7680, slip op. at 24 (NLBB Region
6, Pittsburgh, Pa., Feb. 17, 1976). Judge Roth characterized the union's purpose
in seeking the information as follows: "In the present case, pending or prospective
litigation is not merely incidental or coincidental with the Union's requests; rather,
it is a major reason why the requests were made." Id.
19 Id. 21.
2o Id. 25. The IUE argued vigorously that its obligations under the duty of
fair representation and Title VII would not necessarily be satisfied by invocation of
the available contractual mechanisms: "The Union's duty to eliminate sexual and
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failure to prosecute the Title VII claims of its members-liability
grounded in the union's duty of fair representation 21 and in the
requirements of Title VII itself.22
In the course of his opinion, Judge Roth observed that, aside
from litigation, the union had two avenues 23 open to it by which
to enforce its antidiscrimination policy. First, it was free to strike.
However, economic activity supportive of minority group rights
would very likely fail to command the broad support necessary in
order for concerted activity to be effective.24 Second, the union
could take no action, and leave effectuation of its goals to individual
employees. In addition to depriving such employees of an overview
of the company's policies and practices, 25 such noninvolvement
might, as noted, leave the union open to liability. For these reasons,
the union, in the judge's view, had only one viable option: "[T]o
initiate or join in the filing and prosecution of antidiscrimination
charges and lawsuits." 26 Exceptions to the decision were filed, and
arguments were heard before the NLRB in September, 1977.27
Judge Roth's suggestion that unions could be held liable for
failure to institute Title VII actions 28 raises important issues under
racial discrimination may require both contractual and statutory relief." Charging
Party's Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 13, at 31 (emphasis added).
21 See text accompanying notes 33-92 infra.
22 See text accompanying notes 92-125 infra.
23Judge Roth disregarded possible contractual relief mechanisms. The union
could have utilized the grievance process provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement, and, if dissatisfied with the outcome, could have requested arbitration
pursuant to section XIV(A) of the agreement. Respondents Brief in Support of
Exceptions at 11-12, Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-CA-7680 (NLRB Region
6, Pittsburgh, Pa., filed Feb. 17, 1976). Judge Roth placed great emphasis on the
absence of compulsory arbitration, as if it rendered the antidiscrimination clause
completely nugatory. However, breach of the collective bargaining agreement by
the employer would be actionable under section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
24 Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-CA-7680, slip op. at 25 (NLRB Region
6, Pittsburgh, Pa., Feb. 17, 1976).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27176 DAmy LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Sept. 9, 1977).
28 For some time, it was not certain that unions were permitted to bring Title
VII actions. The statute provides that a Title VII suit may be brought by any
person claiming to be aggrieved or, if the EEOC itself has filed a charge, by any
person the charge alleges was aggrieved by the unlawful employment practice.
Suits may be filed after the regular conditions precedent to lawsuits under the
equal employment opportunities sections of the Civil Rights Act have been met.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975). The Act defines
"person" to include labor unions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. V 1975). Despite
this language, the EEOC initially took the position that labor unions were not
persons aggrieved so as to have standing to sue. In 1966, however, the Commission
completely changed its views, and announced that unions had standing to pursue
both agency and court actions. This position was subsequently supported by the
1978] 1391
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the duty of fair representation and Title VII. It is imperative to
note that these issues are not limited to the factual setting of West-
inghouse-the 8(a)(5) information request context.29  The duty of
fair representation question could be raised directly in an unfair
labor practice before the NLRB 30 if the charging employee alleged
courts in International Chem. Workers v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365
(N.D. Miss. 1966) and Local 186, Int'l Pulp and Paper Workers v. Minnesota
Mining Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969). See also Manning v. General
Motors Corp., 3 FEP Cas. 104 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1973); EEOC Decision No. 71-1547 (March 30,
1971), [1973] EEOC Decisions (CCH) 116228 (even where union represented no
female employees in a particular bargaining unit, it was a proper party to file
charges of sex discrimination regarding failure to hire females for work covered by
the bargaining unit).
Although it is clear that unions that have a collective bargaining relationship
have standing to file both EEOC charges and Title VII suits, several recent cases
cast doubt on the ability of unions to act as class representative for aggrieved em-
ployees during class action litigation. In Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D.
78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court held that an inherent conflict arose from a union's
attempt to act as class representative in a Title VII suit. Since the union had
previously bargained for the very contract that the Title VII suit claimed was
discriminatory, the court held that the union could not fairly and adequately repre-
sent employee class interests. See also Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n
Local 550 v. American Airlines Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied
sub nom. Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550 v. Zipes, 416 U.S.
993 (1974). Cf. Case Note, 15 B.C. INn. & CoM. L. Ev. 1326, 1332 (1974)
(In discussing the issue raised by Air Line Stewards, the author concluded: "It is
clear, then, that a union's status as a certified collective bargaining agent gives it
no special role to play in Title VII disputes."). In both Lynch and Air Line
Stewards, however, the courts, despite denying the unions the right to act as class
representatives, did recognize that their interests were sufficiently adverse to the
employer to permit them to proceed as plaintiffs.
The IUE has brought Title VII suits as class actions in the past, Respondent's
Brief in Support of Exceptions at 2, Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-CA-7680
(NLRB Region 6, Pittsburgh, Pa., filed Feb. 17, 1976), a position for which it
has been attacked under the Lynch rationale. See International Union of EIec.
Workers v. Westinghouse, 73 F.R.D. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying motion to
realign union as party defendant).
2 9 Although Judge Roth correctly characterized the issue as whether informa-
tion sought for litigation purposes is relevant to collective bargaining, and did not
hold that the duty of fair representation was applicable, the two issues are inter-
related. Just as the duty of fair representation extends to union conduct in contract
negotiation and administration, see text accompanying notes 70-92 infra, the em-
ployer's duty to disclose information relevant to collective bargaining also extends
to administration of the agreement. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967). Of course, the fact that the duties are currently co-extensive in no way
requires that they continue to be construed as such. However, the "exclusivity of
power" rationale that this Comment will offer as the touchstone of applicability of
the duty of fair representation has important implications for the disclosure issue.
If, as this Comment demonstrates, the union does not exercise exclusive power
when it refuses to initiate Title VII litigation against the employer, the duty to
disclose similarly cannot apply. When the union does decide to initiate litigation
against the employer, it likewise does not exercise its collective bargaining power
to enter into binding agreements with the employer. In both cases, the union acts
unilaterally-not bilaterally in the spirit of collective bargaining. For that reason,
information requested for litigation purposes is not relevant to collective bargaining.
See text accompanying notes 136-43 infra.
ao See text accompanying notes 49-53 infra.
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that the union's decision not to litigate was arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith.31 Similarly, although the nature of the "duty" to
litigate under Title VII is fundamentally different from that which
is arguably imposed by the duty of fair representation, 32 the union's
refusal to bring a Title VII action against the employer could result
in it's being held liable as a codefendant.
The thesis of this Comment is that neither the duty of fair
representation nor Title VII imposes liability on labor unions for
failure to prosecute the Title VII claims of their members. First,
the origin and evolution of the duty of fair representation will be
examined, and it will be determined that the duty is inappplicable
to a union's decision not to file a Title VII suit against the employer.
Second, the Comment will survey a conflicting line of Title VII
cases on union liability for discriminatory contract clauses and prac-
tices, and will conclude that the policies of Title VII would be im-
peded by a construction that unions must bring suit against the
employer to assure freedom from liability. Third, the Comment
will demonstrate that the policy preference for settlement of indus-
trial disputes by peaceful collective bargaining, embedded in the
NLRA and relevant to the construction of Title VII, mandates the
conclusions reached in the two previous sections. Fourth, the Com-
ment will conclude that requests for information for purposes of
litigation may properly be denied as falling outside the employer's
8(a)(5) duty of disclosure. The latter section will also develop
criteria for separating valid requests for bargaining information
from improper requests for litigation information.
II. THE DUTY OF FAmr REPRESENTATION
A. Doctrinal Development
The duty of fair representation has alternately been described
as "a legal term of art, incapable of precise definition," 33 and as a
"picture . . .still being painted, its final colors having not yet been
placed on the canvas." ' 4 Certainly the scope of its inquiry and the
protection it affords employees have expanded greatly since the
Supreme Court, in first defining the duty, held that a labor union
was liable for negotiating a racially discriminatory contract.35 Since
31 See text accompanying notes 58-67 infra.
32 See text accompanying notes 133-36 infra.
33 Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1972).
34 Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 50
GEo. LJ. 457, 459 (1962).
35 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
1978]
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that time, the duty of a union to represent fairly all of the employees
within the bargaining unit has been extended beyond the union's
negotiating function to its actions at grievances 36 and arbitration,7
and its substantive reach has been significantly broadened to pro-
hibit arbitrary and perfunctory conduct,88 and even union negli-
gence. 39 A brief account of the doctrinal development of the duty
of fair representation is necessary to a reasoned analysis of whether
it should be extended to the union's decision whether to bring a
Title VII suit against the employer.
The labor movement in the United States began as an effort on
the part of workers to organize in the face of overwhelming em-
ployer power. Congress assisted in this effort in 1935 with the
Wagner Act, which recognized the rights of unions to organize for
"the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection ... ,, 40 In seeking to strengthen unions' position vis-4-vis
employers, individual interests were necessarily subordinated to the
larger, collective interest. As unions grew, they developed internal
hierarchies and formalized structures similar to those of the large
corporations with which they were dealing; unions' institutional
interests did not always coincide with the interests of their individual
members. To avoid having these interests trampled upon by the
very groups created to advance them, the courts fashioned the
doctrine known as the duty of fair representation.
The seminal duty of fair representation case is Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R.41  In that case, an exclusively white union
negotiated a new contract which would have "ultimately . . . ex-
clude[d] all Negro firemen from the service." 42 The Court reasoned
that the exercise of the statutorily-granted power to act exclusively
on behalf of those within the bargaining unit necessarily involved
the assumption of a duty to exercise that power in the interest and
behalf of all those affected-the minority as well as the majority.
The Court held that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) implicitly "ex-
presses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representa-
38 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957).
37 See Hines v. Local 377 Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1974), re'd in
part sub nom. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Margetta
v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1974).
38 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
39 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
40Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1970)).
41323 U.S. 192 (1944). The case arose under the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970).
42323 U.S. at 195.
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tive of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the
power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts,
without hostile discrimination against them." 43
The Court applied the fair representation analysis, developed
initially under the RLA,44 to a case arising under the NLRA, in
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,4 5 which also involved a union's con-
duct in the negotiation of a contract. In Huffman, the union and
the employer had agreed to a seniority provision crediting veterans
with preemployment military service. After noting the impossi-
bility of achieving complete satisfaction of all the disparate elements
within a union, the Court concluded that a union must be accorded
"a wide range of reasonableness . . . in serving the unit it repre-
sents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose
in the exercise of its discretion." 46
In Conley v. Gibson,47 the Court extended the duty of fair
representation to encompass union conduct in the administration of
the collective bargaining agreement. The Court held that the duty
set out in Steele to represent fairly all the members of the bargain-
ing unit "does not come to an abrupt end. . . with the making of
an agreement between the union and employer." 48
In Miranda Fuel Co.,49 the NLRB determined for the first time
that a violation of the duty of fair representation constituted an
unfair labor practice. The Board held that the union violated
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA 50 by insisting on a reduction in an
employee's seniority status that was not required by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, and that served no other legitimate
union purpose. The Board held that the obligation to represent all
the employees in the bargaining unit, derived from the exclusive
bargaining provision of section 9(a) of the NLRA,51 was to be viewed
43Id. 202-03.
44 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
45345 U.S. 330 (1953). See also Syres v. Oil Workers Local No. 23, 350
U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam).
46 345 U.S. at 338.
47355 U.S. 41 (1957).
48 Id. 46.
49 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963). The Miranda decision has gained general judicial acceptance, although the
Board's rationale has not been uniformly adopted. See R. GORMA, BAsIc T=_r
oN LABort LAw UNIONIATION AND CoIcm BARGANNG 698-701 (1976).
502 9 U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
5129 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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as a right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing . . . ," guaranteed by section 7 of the Act.52 The
union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by "restraining or coercing" the
employee in the exercise of that right.53
Although the Supreme Court had imposed the duty of fair
representation on union conduct in negotiation and administration
of the collective bargaining agreement, and the NLRB had incorpo-
rated its strictures into the unfair labor practice provisions, the
substantive content of the duty afforded aggrieved employees only
minimal protection against union abuse of power. Huffman em-
phasized the union's "wide range of discretion," and the courts
structured the duty accordingly. Seizing upon the Steele Court's
admonition to unions "to exercise fairly the power conferred upon
. . . [them] in behalf of all those for whom . . . [the unions act],
without hostile discrimination against them," 54 most lower courts
applied a "bad faith" standard of analysis. Courts observed that
the duty consisted of nothing more than a requirement "to forbear
from 'hostile discrimination.' 5r The arbitrariness shown must be
of the bad faith kind. . . . Something akin to factual malice is
necessary." 56 Furthermore, mere allegations that the union's be-
havior had been "invidious" or "discriminatory" were insufficient to
state a claim. A necessary element was "a concomitant identification
5229 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
53 Moreover, the union, in seeking to reduce the employee's seniority, was also
held to have violated section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(2)
(1970), by causing the employer to derogate his employment status, which had
the foreseeable effect of encouraging union membership.
The Board's next fair representation cases dealt with race discrimination, and
in Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964), it held that a union's refusal to
process a worker's grievance because of race was also an unfair labor practice in
violation of NLRA §§8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§158(b)
(1)(A), (b)(2), & (b)(3). In quick succession, the Board found violations in
the establishment and maintenance of racially discriminatory work quotas, reduction
of seniority because of racial considerations, and the refusal to process grievances
concerning a company's racially segregated facilities. See Local 1367, International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced per curiam, 368 F.2d
1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); International Union,
UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 482 (1964); Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B.
312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837
(1967). It is interesting to note that the Board's sudden activity in race dis-
crimination cases, after so many dormant years, came only as the Civil Bights Act
was wending its way through Congress. The Bill was enacted on July 2, 1964;
the Board's decision in Hughes Tool Co. was issued on July 1, 1964. See Sherman,
Uniors Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MI'N.
L. 1Ev. 771, 785, 804 (1965).
54323 U.S. at 203.
55 Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1959).
5GId.
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of lack of good faith .... ,, 57 With its emphasis on the prohibition
of improperly-motivated union conduct, to the exclusion of any
objective requirement of minimally fair representation, the "bad
faith" standard led to many unfair and unjust results.
The Supreme Court, recognizing the need for more effective
protection of employees against improper union action, reformulated
the duty of fair representation In two cases, Humphrey v. Moore,15
and Vaca v. Sipes5 9 In a significant departure from prior law, the
Humphrey Court injected a new element into the duty of fair
representation: a union would not be found liable for action taken
"in good faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination." 60
To underscore this change, the Court concluded that the union had
not violated its duty, for it had acted upon relevant considerations,
"not upon capricious or arbitrary factors." 61
In Vaca, the Court again interpreted the content of the duty of
fair representation, and articulated the standards that govern fair
representation analysis today. The case involved a union's refusal
to process an employee's health-related grievance to arbitration after
an independent physician had found him unfit to work. Relying
upon Humphrey, the Court announced a tripartite standard by
which a union's actions subsequently were to be judged. A union
violates its duty when its actions are "arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith." 62 In its repeated admonitions to unions to avoid
arbitrary conduct,63 in its use of the conjunction "or" in setting out
the test,64 and in its act of contrasting the differences between arbi-
trary and bad faith conduct,65 the Court identified three distinct
elements of a union's obligations, and dispensed with the notion
57 Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 313 F.2d 318, 323 (3d
Cir. 1963). See also ILWU v. Kuntz, 334 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964); Roberts v.
Lehigh & N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963); Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound
Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962).
58375 U.S. 335 (1964).
59 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
60 375 U.S. at 350 (emphasis added).
611d. (emphasis added).
62 386 U.S. at 190.
63 Id. 177, 183.
64 Id. 190.
65 The Court stated:
Others have urged that the union be given substantial discretion . . . to
decide whether a grievance should be taken to arbitration, subject only to
the duty to refrain from patently wrongful conduct such as racial discrim-
ination or personal hostility....
[We accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore
a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion . ...
Id. 190-91 (footnote omitted).
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that bad faith was a universal requirement for such actions. Since
Vaca, the bad faith standard has generally fallen from favor,66 and
the prevailing interpretation is that arbitrary union conduct in ad-
ministration of the collective bargaining agreement violates the duty
of fair representation.
67
06 However, the Supreme Court reintroduced an element of uncertainty in
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). In
dealing with the question whether an employee's suit against his union was pre-
empted, the Court stated that the fair representation doctrine "carries with it the
need to adduce substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and
unrelated to legitimate union objectives . . ." Id. 301. The Court further
warned that the "distinction . . . between honest, mistaken conduct, on the one
hand, and deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment on the other, needs
strictly to be maintained." Id.
The impact of Lockrldge is unclear. The discussion of the fair representation
standard is dicta, and language in both the majority and dissenting opinions sug-
gests that the Court did not intend to make a substantive change in the fair repre-
sentation analysis, but instead merely inaccurately described preexisting law. See
Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TExAs L. RBv.
1119, 1125-26 (1973). See also Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law
Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TExAs L. Rxv. 1037, 1070-71 (1973).
A few courts, however, adhered to the essentially "bad faith" standard of
Lockridge. See, e.g., Jackson v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.
1972); Hiatt v. New York Cent. R.R., 444 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1971). Still others
appeared to confuse its test with that of Vaca. See, e.g., Patterson v. Tulsa Local
No. 513, Motion Picture Operators, 446 F.2d 205 (10th Cir. 1971). Typifying this
confusion, the court in Woods v. North American Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644
(10th Cir. 1973), stated that "breach of the duty of fair representation must be
measured by the standards whether the union's action was arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith [the Vaca test] . . . and whether there is fraud, deceit, dishonest
conduct, or discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate
union activities [the message of Lookridge] .... Id. 648 (citations omitted) (em-
phasis added).
A more sensible result was reached in Berault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes &
Checkers of the ILWU, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974). In determining which test to
apply to the union's actions, the court admitted that Lockridge injected a degree
of ambiguity into the duty of fair representation doctrine. It noted, however, that
the Lockridge Court had derived its bad faith language from Humphrey, which had
contained language to the effect that mere arbitrary conduct may constitute a breach
of the duty, and further noted that Vaca cited Humphrey for the proposition that a
union had "the duty 'to avoid arbitrary conduct."' Consequently, the court was
unable to conclude that Lockridge had rejected "the view that Vaca broadened the
standard of the duty of fair representation to prohibit arbitrary conduct." Id.
263-64. Most significantly, in the Court's latest decision in the fair representation
area, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), the Court, in
dealing with the effect of a breach of the duty of fair representation on the finality
of an arbitral award, cited Vaca approvingly for the proposition that a union may
not "'arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion,"' without ever mentioning Lockridge. Id. 568-69.
67In Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), the Fourth Circuit
interpreted "[t]he repeated references in Vaca to 'arbitrary' union conduct [to in-
dicate] a calculated broadening of the fair representation standard," id. 183, and
held for the first time that arbitrariness alone constituted a breach of the duty. The
court stated:
A union must conform its behavior to each . . . [element in Vacds
tripartite standard]. First, it must treat all factions and segments of its
membership without hostility or discrimination. Next, the broad dis-
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From the foregoing history, it is evident that the substantive
content of the duty of fair representation is evolving, with the courts
and the Board attempting to fashion a set of principles which will
adequately protect individual interests without undermining the
strength essential to the union's proper functioning as collective
bargaining representative. As the courts and the Board have come
to realize, imposition of a stricter standard of analysis, and recogni-
tion of individual rights at the expense of collective rights, have
not produced the disastrous effects once feared.68 Consequently,
administrative and judicial scrutiny of union activities has in-
creased, 9 although the progress has not been uniform and clear
analysis has often been lacking.
The doctrinal fluidity of the duty's substantive content, how-
ever, should not be confused with the relatively static character of
the law regarding the scope of its applicability. In direct contrast
to the expansion in its substantive content, the boundaries of the
duty's reach over union conduct have not been extended beyond
those set in Steele and Conley. Thus extension of the duty beyond
the original settings of contract negotiation and administration
would constitute a dramatic step in fair representation doctrine.
The next subsection of this Comment will consider the "exclusivity
of power" rationale that underlies the duty of fair representation,
and will conclude that it does not support extension of the duty to
require scrutiny of the union's decision whether to bring Title VII
litigation against the employer.
cretion of the union in asserting the rights of its individual members must
be exercised in complete good faith and honesty. Finally, the union must
avoid arbitrary conduct. Each of these requirements represents a distinct
and separate obligation, the breach of which may constitute the basis for
civil action.
Id.
The Board has also abandoned the "bad faith" test in favor of the stricter
scrutiny mandated by Vaca. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 315, 217 N.L.R.B. 616
(1975), enforced, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976).
68"Some unions have survived every attack which government, management,
and even other factious in labor have mounted against them. Recognition of the
rights of a few unjustly treated employees would not spell the doom of collective
bargaining." Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mic. L. .vv. 1435, 1495
(1963).
69 The Sixth Circuit appears to have expanded the construction of the Vaca
arbitrariness standard by incorporating a due care requirement into the duty of fair
representation. In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975),
the court held that negligence on the part of the union in handling a grievance
amounted to unfair representation.
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B. Applicability of the Duty
In analyzing the scope of the duty's applicability, it is crucial
to take cognizance of its judicial origin. Judicial creation of the
duty of fair representation was legitimized by reading into section
9(a)'s 7 grant of power to labor unions the concomitant duty to
exercise that power fairly. When the union conduct at issue does
not involve use of the statutorily-granted power, there can be no
tie-in with the statutory language of section 9(a), and legitimate ex-
tension of the duty is impossible.
Although, as noted above,71 judicial and scholarly efforts have
centered on definition of the substantive content of the duty, two
commentators have discussed the rationale for imposition of the
duty. Professor Gorman has stated: "Most clearly, since the duty is
derived from the union's power as exclusive representative in bar-
gaining and grievance-processing, it is only in those activities that
the duty of fair representation applies." 72 Professor Summers has
identified "two separate tap roots" of the duty of fair representation:
First, a union vested with statutory authority as the
exclusive representative, must have a statutory duty, much
like that of a governmental body, to represent fairly those
governed by its agreements....
Second, a union that acts as bargaining representative
of employees owes to the employees it represents the duty
owed by an agent to its principal, and the duty owed by a
fiduciary to its beneficiary7 3
The two "tap roots" differ in that they focus on the two sources
of the union's power as exclusive collective bargaining representa-
tive. The first refers to the congressional grant of power that enables
unions to bind all members of the bargaining unit, even those that
did not choose the union as representative, to the results of the
union's collective bargaining with the employer. The second focuses
on the power granted the union by the employees when they select
the union as their collective bargaining representative through the
7029 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
71 See notes 53-69 & accompanying text, supra.
72 R. GowmAN, BASIC TEXT oN LABOR LAW UNIoNmzATioN AND CoLEcnVE
BACAunfNG 706 (1976).
73 Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement:
What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 253 (1977).
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statutory machinery provided in section 9 of the NLRA.74 There-
fore, although the two "tap roots" focus on different sources of
power, both tie the union's duty of fair representation to the grant
of exclusive power as collective bargaining representative. Professor
Summers emphasizes the interrelationship between power and duty
by quoting the language of the Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R.: 71 "It is a principle of general application that the exer-
cise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the
assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their
interest and behalf .... ,
Although Professor Summers offers these "tap roots" as the
rationale for application of the duty of fair representation to union
conduct in negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, he
offers basically the same reasoning for extending the duty to ad-
ministration of the agreement. Once again, Professor Summers
focuses on the source of the exclusive power. In contrast to section
9(a)'s explicit grant of exclusive control of the negotiation process,
it is only by contractual agreement with the employer that the union
acquires exclusive control of the enforcement machinery. 7 Pro-
fessor Summers emphasizes that Congress' refusal explicitly to grant
exclusive control of administration of the agreement to unions indi-
cates a congressional policy that unions need less flexibility in that
area.78 However, he only uses this argument to support his con-
tention that duty of fair representation standards should be more
strict when the alleged breach occurs in the administration of the
7429 U.S.C. § 159 (1970). The statutory procedure is not the only method
of achieving the status of exclusive bargaining representative. For example, an
employer can voluntarily recognize a union as collective bargaining representative.
In addition, under rare circumstances, a union can be installed as bargaining repre-
sentative in an unfair labor practice proceeding. See generally B. GoBuTA, supra
note 72, at 40-132.
75323 U.S. 192 (1944).
76 Id. 202, quoted in Summers, supra note 73, at 253.
77 Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, wvithout the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a col-
lective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect ....
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970) (emphasis added). Under most collective bargaining
agreements the union has exclusive control over access to the grievance adjustment
process and arbitration. See [1975] 2 CoLL. BARG. NEGOTIATONS & CoNr. (BNA)
51:1-21.
7 8 "The explicit judgment of Congress, articulated in section 9(a), was that
the union needed exclusive power to negotiate agreements, but did not need ex-
clusive power to settle grievances arising under the agreements:' Summers, supra
note 73, at 255.
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agreement.7 9 Professor Summers in no way implies that the "ex-
clusivity of power" rationale does not justify extension of the duty
to union conduct in contract administration. In fact, he states:
"By virtue of this contractually derived status as exclusive enforcer
of the collective agreement, the union assumes a heavy responsibility
to exercise its control on behalf of, rather than against the individual
employee." S0 Indeed, to distinguish between the sources of power
would be manifestly unreasonable, because it is only through use of
the statutorily-granted power to bargain collectively with the em-
ployer that the union can gain exclusive control of the enforcement
machinery. The power to eliminate the individual employee's con-
trol over enforcement of his own contractual rights justifies imposi-
tion of a corresponding duty of fair representation.
Thus Professors Gorman and Summers essentially agree that
the duty of fair representation applies to union conduct that in-
volves the exercise of exclusive power. In those situations, the in-
dividual employee has no power to protect his own best interests;
rather, he must rely on the union to protect them in its actions as
collective bargaining representative.
Although there exists little Supreme Court guidance on the
question of applicability of the duty of fair representation, language
in the Steele and Humphrey cases supports the "exclusivity of
power" rationale. In Steele, the Court emphasized the relationship
between power and duty in strong language: "Unless the labor
union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-union
members of the craft, . . . the minority would be left with no
means of protecting their . ..right to earn a livelihood .. . ." I,
The Humphrey Court made no distinction based on the source of
the exclusive power. The Court stated: "The undoubted broad
authority of the Union as exclusive bargaining agent in the nego-
tiation and administration of a collective bargaining contract is ac-
companied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and
duty of fair representation." 82
79 "These differences between contract negotiation and contract administration
as reflected in the statutory policy, the status of the union, and the practical needs
of the parties, clearly call for different standards for measuring the duty of fair
representation." Id. 257.
80 Id. 256.
8i 323 U.S. 192, 201 (1944).
82 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964). There is language in Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957), that is inconsistent with the "exclusivity of power" rationale for
imposition of the duty of fair representation. In Conley, the defendant union argued
that it was not obligated to handle the grievances because of the existence of
alternative remedies for aggrieved employees. The alternative remedies were pro-
[Vol. 126:1388
THE UNION AS TITLE VII PLAINTIFF
Extension of duty of fair representation scrutiny to a union's
decision whether to file a Title VII suit against the employer could
not be justified by use of the "exclusivity of power" rationale. When
the union decides not to instigate Title VII litigation, it exercises
no power that binds the individual employee in any way: the union
can never prevent the employee from bringing the action on his
own.83 When the union does not exercise its exclusive power as
collective bargaining representative, a court cannot tie the duty of
fair representation into the statutory language of section 9(a). With-
out a credible relationship to the statutory language, judicial ex-
tension of the duty would lack legitimacy.
The union's lack of exclusive power to litigate a Title VII
action was recognized in Stewards v. American Airlines, Inc.s  In
Stewards, the court held that a union (the Air Line Stewards and
Stewardesses Association, Local 550, TWU, AFL-CIO) could not
bind individual plaintiffs in a sex discrimination class action to the
cedures under the Railway Labor Act that enabled employees to file grievances with
the Adjustment Board or bring suit for breach of contract. The Court replied:
We need not pass on the Union's claim that it was not obliged to handle
any grievances at all because we are clear that once it undertook to bargain
or present grievances for some of the employees it represented it could not
refuse to take similar action in good faith for other employees just because
they were Negroes.
Id. 47.
Broad reading of this language would allow extension of the duty even to the
situation hypothesized below, where a union that has brought Title VII suits on
behalf of other groups, refuses to do so for black employees, and the refusal is
racially motivated. See text accompanying notes 88-92, infra. However, other
language suggests that the Court did focus on the power granted to the union, and
also on the realities of industrial relations:
The Railway Labor Act, in an attempt to aid collective action by em-
ployees, conferred great power and protection on the bargaining agent
chosen by a majority of them. As individuals or small groups the em-
ployees cannot begin to possess the bargaining power of their representative
in negotiating with the employer or in presenting their grievances to him.
Id.
In this passage, the Court realized that acceptance of the union's argument would
mean that black employees would be foreclosed from the informal, and more
efficacious, grievance process that white employees could utilize; because then only
the union could decide whether or not to put its power behind the aggrieved em-
ployee and invoke the grievance process. The Railway Labor Act's alternative
remedies could not be considered equal to normal union-backed grievance
processing. In the Conley context, the union's power could not be characterized
as exclusive, but the comparative inefficacy of the alternative remedies made the
union's power -bver the grievance process sufficiently imposing to justify application
of the duty.
33 In addition, invocation of contractual relief mechanisms does not bar recourse
to Title VII remedies. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
the Court held that an unfavorable arbitral award did not bar a subsequent Title VII
action.
846 F.E.P. Cas. 1197 (7th Cir. 1973).
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settlement it had achieved with the defendant airlines. The court
noted the conflicting interests that jeopardized the union's role as
class representative,8 5 and required that the individual plaintiffs be.
accorded the right to exclude themselves or appear through counsel.
The union argued that its status as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive vested it with "the power to accommodate and adjust the rights
of present and former stewardesses which springs from Title VII,
subject only to its obligation of fair representation." 86 The court
refused to alter the standard of adequacy of class representation on
the basis of the union's status as collective bargaining representative,
stating: "Title VII, unlike the National Labor Relations Act and
Railway Labor Act, does not create nor necessarily recognize powers
of exclusive representation .... 8s7 Consequently, the union is
not "accorded the same power and held to the same degree of duty
as [Steele, Humphrey, and Vaca] accord it in the formulation and
administration of collective bargaining agreements .,.. 8 s8
The conclusion that the duty of fair representation does not
extend to a union's decision whether to prosecute Title VII claims
has one disturbing implication. Perhaps the core duty of fair repre-
sentation situation is the case of union action or inaction motivated
by racial prejudice. Although the case would undoubtedly be a
rare one, it is not inconceivable that a union would prosecute Title
VII claims for certain groups, such as white employees alleging re-
verse discrimination or female employees alleging sex discrimina-
tion, but then refuse to file Title VII suits on behalf of black
employees.8 9 If the refusal were racially motivated, one might well
consider extending the duty of fair representation to prohibit such
union conduct, despite the aforementioned inconsistency with the
"exclusivity of power" rationale. However, tortured extension of
the duty of fair representation is not the only available method of
proscribing such racially-motivated union conduct. Title VII itself
arguably proscribes such union conduct. Section 703(c) provides
that it is an unlawful employment practice for a union "to exclude
or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 90 Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co.91 involved an
85 Id. 1200.
86 Id.
87 Id. 1201.
88 Id.
89 Cf. Summers, supra note 73, at 272-74 (discriminatory access to union-
supported grievance processing).
90 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
91373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
[Vol. 126:1388
THE UNION AS TITLE VII PLAINTIFF
analogous situation, in which a union was held liable under Title
VII for, inter alia, its failure to process a grievance filed by a black
employee who had alleged that inadequate employment opportuni-
ties existed for blacks. Bush did not involve discriminatory access
to the grievance process; the union was held liable for its general
failure to eliminate discrimination. The court concluded: "Thus,
in violation of the Act, the unions have failed in their duty to
represent the black class members without regard to race." 92 The
aggressive attitude of the court in Bush is consistent with the broad
"or otherwise to discriminate against" statutory language. Dis-
criminatory access to union support of Title VII litigation would
thus involve a substantial threat of Title VII liability. The courts
would be well advised to attack the rare case of discriminatory ac-
cess to union-supported Title VII litigation through the use of Title
VII itself, rather than through tortured extension of the duty of
fair representation.
III. UNION LIAILrrY FOR DISCRIMINATORY CONTRACT
CLAUSES AND PRACTICES
Collective bargaining agreements are brought into existence by
negotiation between, and eventual concurrence of, the employer
and the union. When provisions of those agreements are allegedly
violative of Title VII, a complex legal problem inevitably arises.
Although each party theoretically "agrees" to each contractual pro-
vision, disparities in bargaining power may enable one party to
impose terms on the other, despite the latter party's best negotiating
efforts to avoid that result. Thus courts have been faced with the
choice of either scrutinizing the negotiating process to determine if
both parties should be held liable, or simply holding both parties
equally responsible for the resultant agreement. The latter-"result"
-approach in effect forces a party that lacked the bargaining power
to exclude an illegal contractual provision to resort to litigation to
invalidate the provision. This section of the Comment will examine
the conflicting line of cases on this question, and will conclude that
the "result" standard is an unsound construction of Title VII.
For reasons that will be described below, this issue has been
raised most frequently in the context of union liability for seniority
systems that perpetuate past discrimination. Although the Supreme
Court's recent decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters
92 Id. 536.
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v. United States 93 greatly reduces the significance of the seniority
clause problem, the cases are still instructive on the broader issue of
union liability for discriminatory contract clauses and practices.
A major focus of the courts' efforts in Title VII cases has been
the assessment of the legality of present seniority systems that per-
petuate past discriminatory practices. Faced with minority workers'
complaints that existing seniority systems perpetuated past discrimi-
nation, the courts were forced, early in the history of Title VII
litigation, to choose between a "status quo" or a "rightful place"
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act's mandates. The "status quo"
theory absolved employers and unions from liability if the system
then in effect did not facially discriminate in any way. The "right-
ful place" theory demanded more of unions and employers. Under
that theory, a contract seniority provision would violate Title VII
if, although neutral on its face, it failed to permit minority em-
ployees an opportunity to assume the positions they would have held
had there been no past discrimination. Although soon after the
passage of the Act commentators declared that "title VII does not
call for union action to correct racial imbalances, due to prior
practices," 94 the lower courts chose to utilize the stricter "rightful
place" interpretation. 95 A finding of liability thus rested upon the
existence of two conditions: pre-Act discrimination, and a seniority
or promotion system that in any way perpetuated the effects of that
93 U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977). In Teamsters, the Court rejected a solid
phalanx of lower court precedent that had held illegal facially neutral contracts
that failed to remedy pre-Act discrimination. See, e.g., McArthur v. Southern
Airways, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1975), vacated and remanded, 556 F.2d
298 (5th Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court held that the seniority system at issue,
which afforded no constructive seniority to victims of pre-Act discrimination, fell
within the protective sphere of section 703(h) of Title VII, which provides:
[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system ...
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to dis-
criminate because of race . . . or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h) (1970).
The Supreme Court rejected the government's position that no seniority system that
perpetuates pre-Act discrimination could be "bona fide." Application of such a
principle, it observed, would "destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of
employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the
passage of the Act." - U.S. at -, 97 S. Ct. at 1863.
94 Sherman, supra note 53, at 798.
95 Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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past discrimination. 8 Under such conditions, many seniority sys-
tems appeared to be potentially illegal.
97
When joined as co-defendant in a Title VII suit against an
employer, unions asserted the defense that they did no hiring, test-
ing, or promoting, and thus could not be held responsible for any
of the employer's prior acts of discrimination.98 The courts quickly
rejected this position, pointing out that, since Steele, unions were
obligated to attempt to protect minority members from the dis-
criminatory acts of the employer. The gravamen of the charges
against the unions was that the collective agreements negotiated
between them and the employers tended to perpetuate past dis-
crimination, thus constituting present discrimination.
There is no doubt but that unions have an affirmative obliga-
tion under Title VII to root out the effects of past discrimination.
For example, in Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co.,°9 two unions asserted
the defense that they were merely passive observers of the company's
discrimination. Each union claimed to be powerless to revamp the
discriminatory seniority system that was the net product of two
separate collective bargaining agreements. The Fifth Circuit found
the company and both unions liable under Title VII, and stated
that the Civil Rights Act imposed on the employer and the unions
an affirmative duty to revise the contract, rules, and regulations to
assure compliance with the Act. The "ineffectual passivism" of the
unions in their relations with the employer facilitated a pattern of
continuing job discrimination, which result violated Title VII. 1' °
Other courts have found unions in violation of Tide VII where they
passively accepted their employers' discriminatory practices, 101 or
failed to take steps to discourage the employers' policies.10 2 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has also held
that a union commits an unlawful employment practice when it
acquiesces in a discriminatory policy initiated by the employer.
03
In Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems Inc.,'04 in which the plaintiff
06 See Youngdahl, Suggestions for Labor Unions Faced with Liability under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 Arm L. REv. 631 (1973).
97 Id.
9s See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
09 500 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1974).
200 Id. 1379.
101 EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
102 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y.
1970), modified on appeal, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
103EEOC decision No. 72-1380 (March 17, 1972), [1973] EEOC DEcisIoNs
(CCH) 6364; EEOC decision No. 71-1504 (March 25, 1971), [1973] EEOC
DjEcIsioS (CCH) f 6233.
204 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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alleged racial discrimination in job assignments, the court spelled
out in more detail the nature of the union's obligations. It initially
noted that the duty of fair representation and Title VII impose an
affirmative obligation on labor unions, which cannot be met by
simple refusal "to sign overtly discriminatory agreements." 105 Ac-
quiescence in an employer's practices would result in the same
conditions Steele condemned. 1 6 This outcome could be avoided,
the court concluded, by requiring "the union, in its vital role as
bargaining agent, to negotiate actively for nondiscriminatory treat-
ment . "..." 107
These decisions suggest that, although a union may be liable
for passively acquiescing in an employer's discriminatory policies, it
would fulfill its statutory duties under Title VII by prosecuting all
grievances referred to it, and by actively negotiating for fair em-
ployment treatment. These cases, however, do not address the ques-
tion whether the union's actions will be judged on the basis of its
negotiating effort, or on the basis of the contract that is actually
negotiated. In each instance, the court found that the union had
failed to exercise its best efforts to eradicate the discrimination.
Thus none of the courts had occasion to consider whether Title
VII's requirements are met when the union, after aggressively de-
manding that a discriminatory practice or contract provision be
changed, nevertheless, as a result of unequal bargaining power or
internal pressure, concedes to the unyielding employer. A 1973
EEOC decision suggests that the very act of making such demands
will serve to insulate the union. 08 In a controversy over a sex-
segregated wage schedule, the EEOC held that since the union had
actively opposed inclusion of the unlawful features of the wage plan,
and had proposed nondiscriminatory alternatives, it had not com-
mitted an unlawful employment practice under section 703(c) of
the Civil Rights Act.10 9
The above analysis implies that strenuous good-faith bargaining
and grievance processing within the collective bargaining context
105 Id. 989.
106 Id. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
107 478 F.2d at 989 (emphasis added). In holding the union liable, the court
also emphasized the union's failure to act in the face of "solid evidence of employer
discrimination." Id. See also United States v. Local 357, IBEW, 356 F. Supp. 104
(D. Nev. 1973).
108 EEOC decision No. 70-112 (Sept. 5, 1969), [1973] EEOC DEcsioNs
(CCH) 1T6108."
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970). In another EEOC action, the Commission
stated that, in the absence of a contract prohibiting racial discrimination, the con-
tracting union was under an obligation to propose such a provision. EEOC de-
cision No. 71-90 (July 17, 1970), [1973] EEOC DEcrsoNs (CCH) 116163.
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would satisfy a union's duty under Tide VII, but this approach has
not been unanimously adopted. 10
Some courts would impose an even stricter requirement, and
hold unions liable for the results of its negotiating efforts. Such a
position disregards the fact that the contract is the product of nego-
tiations between two parties who may not always possess equal bar-
gaining power. It is in these cases that a de facto obligation to bring
a Title VII action has been created. In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Co.,"' the union argued that it was a helpless nego-
tiator in bargaining over discrimination. The court, however, sar-
castically observed that the union deserved more credit for its
misdeeds. The test the court imposed was indeed a strict one: the
union would be held to the natural consequences of the negotiated
contract. Without investigating the underlying bargaining, or the
union's intentions, the court imposed liability after a strict factual
determination. The contract was discriminatory and the union was
a party to that contract; it, too, was therefore liable. Similarly, the
court in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp."12 suggested no distinction be-
tween those situations in which a union bargains for, or tacitly
accepts, employment discrimination, and those where the union
actively resists discrimination, but because of inadequate bargaining
power cannot force its position into the contract. Although Robin-
son involved a union pressuring an employer to adopt a discrimina-
tory system, the court painted Title VII liability with a broad brush:
"Despite the fact that a strike over a contract provision may impose
economic costs, if a discriminatory contract provision is acceded to
the bargainee as well as the bargainor will be held liable." "13 The
110 Under such an approach, the IUE's fears of liability would be illusory.
Judge Roth observed:
In 1966, 1970 and 1973, the Union unsuccessfully proposed that the [non-
discrimination] clause be made subject to binding arbitration. In these
negotiations IUE made other proposals which related or purported to relate
to the status of female and minority group employees. In 1966 and 1970,
IUE proposed clauses to prohibit sex discrimination in upgrading and
layoffs, extension of disability insurance coverage to pregnancy, and train-
ing of females for higher paying jobs. In 1970 and 1973, IUE proposed a
layoff and recall system based on plantwide seniority, and plantwide post-
ing of job opportunities. In 1973 IUE also proposed a joint employer-
union committee, coupled with binding arbitration, to review rates alleged
to be discriminatory, and elimination of all contract provisions which
treated pregnancy in a different manner from other forms of disability ....
Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-CA-7680, slip op. at 8 (NLRB Region 6, Pitts-
burgh, Pa., Feb. 17, 1976).
111491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
112 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
1a3 Id. 799 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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Robinson court framed the issue as whether "[a]voidance of union
pressure . . .constitute[s] a legitimate business purpose which can
override the adverse racial impact of an otherwise unlawful employ-
ment practice." 114 In Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp.,115 the de-
fendant unions argued that because they were in no way responsible
for the discrimination at issue, the plaintiffs had not made out a
prima facie claim against them. Although the court stressed that,,
the collective bargaining agreement "clearly carried forward the
company's prior discrimination," it held that "[the] primary basis
of the Union's liability is their joining with the Company in the
collective bargaining agreements .... ," 116
Under this strict interpretation of Title VII, a union is placed
in a highly tenuous position. If it has followed a strict nondiscrimi-
natory policy, has faithfully processed all grievances, and has con-
sistently opposed any discriminatory contract provision, it may
nonetheless be vulnerable to suit if, because of its bargaining weak-
ness, depleted strike benefits funds, fragile political support, public
pressure, or other factors, it is unable to successfully bargain with
an obstinate and recalcitrant employer over discrimination issues.
The inquiry, as noted, is rather mechanistic: if the contract is illegal,
the union is liable, whether it or the employer proposed the con-
tract initially, whether the union actively resisted, or whether the
employer has preponderant bargaining power. Under the strict
"results" standard, the union effectively seals its fate by signing the
agreement. Indeed, the Robinson court explicitly held out the
possibility of striking rather than acceding to a discriminatory pro-
posal, despite the severe economic costs this would impose on the
union.11
7
One commentator has recognized the union's potential liability
in such situations, and has suggested a policy very much akin to that
adopted by the IUE. 11  If a union faces potential liability merely
14 Id.
1"5 392 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 544 F.2d 837
(5th Cir. 1977) (union liability affirmed).
116 Id. 423.
117 judge Roth realistically observed that economic activity in support of anti-
discrimination goals would probably be ineffective, due to probable lack of support
of the membership. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
118 Youngdahl, supra note 96. In Westinghouse the employer argued:
[T]he IUE wants to sue Westinghouse because it figures if it does not,
someone will sue the IUE, either because the IUE has already violated the
law by making a contract, or because someone will say the IUE has failed
to fairly represent employees by not suing the employer to enforce rights
of employees under Title VII.
Brief on Behalf of Respondent, supra note 14, at 95-96.
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for being a signatory to a collective agreement that permits or re-
quires past discrimination, its only hope lies in "correct[ing] viola-
dons of the law before anyone [in the union] gets litigious.. ,, 119
Initially a union must examine its collective bargaining relation-
ships to identify potential Tide VII problems created or perpetuated
by contracts to which it is a party. If such problems exist, and the
employer stubbornly refuses to change the offending provision, 20
the union must adopt a more aggressive stance:
If the employer refuses to correct the offending condi-
tion, the next step in an affirmative course of action is the
filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
charge by the union against the employer. If EEOC pro-
ceedings still do not have the desired effect, private suit
can be brought six months after the charge is filed.
121
The existence of an illegal contract, then, puts a union on
notice that, unless and until the offending provisions are eliminated,
it stands subject to liability under Title VII. In order to protect
itself from crushing liability, the union has every incentive to have
the legality of the questionable clause or practice ascertained by a
court, before affected employees are significantly damaged.
Although International Brotherhood of Teamsters 122 moots the
issue in the context of seniority systems that perpetuate pre-Act dis-
crimination, cases such as Macklin 123 and Detroit Edison Co.,124
which involve disputes over such diverse topics as job assignments,
hiring, and promotion policy, require that the question be answered.
Careful analysis indicates that the "best efforts" standard is a more
sound construction of Title VII than the "results" standard.
It must be conceded that the "results" standard cannot be
justified by the equal culpability of both parties if the weak party
119 Youngdabl, supra note 96, at 635.
120 Youngdahl suggests that some employer suspicion may stem from the fact
that many Title V11 remedial principles are similar to union goals that the employer
has traditionally resisted, such as emphasis toward "on the job" training as opposed
to testing and educational requirements. Id. 636.
121 Id. 636. But see Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089
(S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972), wherein
the court stated: "[A] union is under no legal obligation to challenge the validity
of State laws and regulations regarding the employment of women by initiating a
suit to determine the validity of such laws and the failure of the union to do so
does not constitute a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 325 F. Supp. at
1099.
122 _ U.S. , 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
123 See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra.
1.24 See note 101 supra.
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is held liable despite its best efforts to resist inclusion of the dis-
criminatory provision in the contract. Absent some other reason
for the imposition of liability, the "results" standard would thus
embody a fundamental misconception of the collective bargaining
process: that both parties are equally responsible for all parts of the
collective agreements. Only two justifications would appear to sup-
port such a construction: the desire to assure effective enforcement
of Title VII, and the need to create manageable judicial standards
for courts to apply in cases where an employer and a union are
joined as codefendants.
As noted above, there is no doubt that the "results" standard
creates a potent incentive for unions to institute Title VII litigation
against the employer. However, analysis of the burdens and benefits
of using the threat of liability as an incentive for union enforcement
demonstrates that such an approach is undesirable. There is a
serious flaw in the enforcement rationale: the fact is that unions
forced into the courtroom by fear of Title VII liability would be
less than ideal advocates. Motivated solely by its desire to avoid
liability, the union would have absolutely no stake in the outcome
of the "test case." If the court invalidated the questionable pro-
vision, the threat of liability would be removed. If no Title VII
violation were found, the union would likewise emerge "victorious."
Regardless of the outcome, the union's sole objective-avoidance of
liability-would be achieved.
The concern for manageable judicial standards, although en-
titled to greater weight, does not compel acceptance of the "results"
standard. Although the judiciary is understandably reluctant to
scrutinize the bargaining conduct of the parties, the task is not one
of insuperable difficulty. A workable solution would allow the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case against both parties without
bringing in evidence of the union and company positions during
negotiations. The court could then allow the defendant (either the
union or the company) to prove that it had exercised its best efforts
to prevent inclusion of the provision, but was forced to bow to the
codefendant's superior bargaining strength. The court as fact finder
would not be required to assess the relative responsibility of the
parties to the contract; liability would attach if the "weak" party
had any responsibility for the illegal provision (aside from its signa-
ture on the agreement). Although courts do not possess the collec-
tive bargaining expertise of the NLRB, the judiciary is hardly an
unsophisticated assessor of bargaining relationships. Effective use
of the burden of proof mechanism would prod unions to negotiate
[VoL 126:1388
THE UNION AS TITLE VII PLAINTIFF
actively, but would allow courts to justly dispose of the rare cases in
which a union could demonstrate its lack of responsibility for the
discriminatory contract provision.
Although the courts dearly would prefer not to scrutinize the
bargaining conduct of the parties, manageable judicial standards are
desirable only insofar as they effectuate the policies of Title VII.
The absence of a strong justification for the harsh "results" standard,
coupled with the dangers presented by disinterested advocacy, man-
date the relatively limited judicial role required by the "best efforts"
standard.
IV. LABOR POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The first section of this Comment determined that extension of
duty of fair representation scrutiny to a union's decision not to
bring Title VII litigation against the employer clashes with the "ex-
clusivity of power" rationale that has operated as the justification
for judicial imposition of the duty. Adoption of another rationale
for imposition of the duty would raise two problems. First, it is
difficult to see how another rationale could be tied into the language
of section 9(a)-the statutory source of the duty of fair representa-
tion.125 Second, as will be demonstrated in this section of the Com-
ment, extension of the duty to require scrutiny of a union's decision
not to bring Title VII suits against the employer would adversely
affect the collective bargaining process that the NLRA is primarily
intended to foster.
The second section of the Comment demonstrated that the strict
interpretation of union (and management) liability for discrimina-
tory contract clauses and practices is an unsound construction of
Title VII. This section of the Comment will demonstrate that
adoption of the "results" standard would have a devastating effect
on the orderly collective bargaining process contemplated by the
NLRA.
In its broadest sense, Emporium-Capwell's reconciliation of the
collective bargaining and antidiscrimination principles 126 is instruc-
tive on the proper construction of Title VII. Although a court
interpreting Title VII need not regard a detrimental effect on
orderly collective bargaining as determinative, such an inquiry must
be part of the court's analysis. Refusal to consider the effect of a
Title VII liability standard on the collective bargaining process
would disregard a fundamental rule of statutory construction. In
125 See text accompanying notes 70-92 supra.
126 See text accompanying notes 1-11 supra.
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Emporium-Capwell, although the Court refused to construe the
Labor Act to protect employees' anddiscriminatory protest activity
from employer reprisal, it maintained that the separate legislative
components should be construed in accordance with the overall
scheme of labor relations regulation. 27 Thus, the effect that a de
facto requirement to bring Title VII litigation has on the collective
bargaining process is relevant to the construction of Title VII.
The fundamental importance of the collective bargaining
process to our national labor policy is set forth in the introductory
section of the Wagner Act.128 Congress was concerned that the bitter
labor disputes characteristic of the early twentieth century would
continue to interrupt the nation's trade and commerce. It conse-
quently attempted to create an "equality of bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees," so as to encourage the "friendly
adjustments of industrial disputes." 129 The settlement of disputes
through collective bargaining, rather than through the exercise of
unmitigated economic and physical power, became the linchpin of
our labor policy. It is thus vital that the collective bargaining
process be protected in order to effectuate the primary purposes of
the NLRA. In examining a union's duty of fair representation, the
Fifth Circuit, in Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB ob-
served:
[T]he vital issue . . . resolves itself into that of deter-
mining at what point the exclusive bargaining agent's duty
to represent fairly the interests of each individual employee
must bow to the equally comprehensive obligation of nego-
tiating and administering the bargaining contract in ac-
cordance with the act's primary policy of fostering union-
employer relations.1
80
The union's fulfillment of its duty of fair representation and
Title VII obligations through active negotiation and grievance
processing is consistent with its role as collective bargaining repre-
sentative; indeed, these activities constitute the essence of the union's
12 7 See note 3 supra.
128 Section 1 of the Wagner Act provides, in pertinent part: "It is declared to
be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining .... " Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (cur-
rent version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
129 Id.
130368 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967) (em-
phasis added).
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functions.131 To this extent, then, the union's obligations to repre-
sent its members fairly and to bargain with the employer mesh
neatly. Once the notion is introduced that a union, in order to
meet its legal obligations, must file judicial and administrative
actions, however, this mesh becomes unraveled, and the equilibrium
between the two obligations is destroyed. The filing of a lawsuit
is the very antithesis of collective bargaining. Once litigation is
initiated, a mutually satisfactory cooperative arrangement is prob-
ably foreclosed, unless the parties settle prior to judgment. Rather,
a third party is asked to impose a solution on the deadlocked parties
-a far cry from the "friendly adjustment of industrial disputes"
envisioned in the NLRA. To hold that a union must institute and
maintain Title VII suits in order to ensure its freedom from liability
would strike an irreversible blow to the policy of mutual accommo-
dation through bargaining that is embodied in the NLRA.
In the Westinghouse case, Judge Roth observed that litigation
of discrimination charges might not constitute a derogation of the
collective bargaining relationship, but "might well constitute con-
duct to preserve that relationship." 132 It is difficult to imagine,
however, how pending litigation could enhance collective bargain-
ing. The employer, fearful that sensitive information can and will
be used against it, is liable to balk at every step of the negotiations.
Similarly, bitterness engendered by contested discrimination cases
cannot fail but to affect the daily interaction of the two parties. 133
Thus, both extension of the duty of fair representation and
adoption of the "results" standard would adversely affect the collec-
tive bargaining process, although their effects would differ in degree.
As described in the first section of this Comment, the duty of fair
representation is primarily negative in focus. Extension of the duty
to forbid union refusals to bring Title VII suits that are grounded
in impermissible motives would significantly encourage resort to
litigation, to the detriment of the collective bargaining process.
131 The Court in Conley v. Gibson stated:
Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other things, it in-
volves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other working rules ....
The bargaining representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying
out these functions than it can in negotiating a collective agreement.
355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
132 Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 6-CA-7680, slip op. at 25-26 (NLBB
region 6, Pittsburgh, Pa., Feb. 17, 1976).
133In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the
Court, in holding that the filing of an EEOC charge did not toll the statute of
limitations applicable to an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, stated: "We
recognize . . . that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at con-
ciliation .... ." Id. 461.
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As the Board emphasized in General Truck Drivers Local 315,13
the arbitrariness prong does, to a certain extent, impose an affirma-
tive duty to take action:
Whatever the precise outlines of this duty, a subject of
scholarly debate of long standing, its fiduciary nature con-
notes some degree of affirmative responsibility. . . . [T]he
duty of fair representation is more than an absence of bad
faith or hostile motivation ...
Another way this elusive element of the duty of fair
representation has been authoritatively described is the
avoidance of arbitrary conduct. Here again, although
phrased in negative terms, the duty is to some extent an
affirmative one, for a common characteristic of arbitrariness
is the absence of some ingredient in the decisionmaking
process ... 135
Thus, to the extent that a union might resort to litigation to avoid
the appearance of arbitrary conduct, application of the duty of fair
representation to a Union's decision not to instigate a Title VII
action would disrupt the collective bargaining process.
The "results" standard would have a much greater destructive
impact on collective bargaining. Unlike the duty of fair representa-
tion, the "results" standard does not focus on defects in the union
decision-making process; it threatens Title VII liability even for
unions that have vigorously represented minority interests. The
"results" standard focuses on one aspect of the union's conduct:
whether it signed the collective bargaining agreement. On issues
that implicate Title VII, agreement between the employer and the
union would constitute a mere preliminary step to dispositive settle-
ment of the issues by litigation. Emphasis on litigation rather than
negotiation as the settlement mechanism for these disputes contra-
venes the goal of an orderly collective bargaining process embodied
in the NLRA. In addition, the threat of liability would undoubt-
edly result in expensive litigation whenever a questionable provision
was included in the agreement-litigation that could only endanger
the bargaining relationship of the parties.
V. THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE INFORMlATION
In NLRLB v. Acme Industrial Co.,136 the Supreme Court held
that the employer's obligation to provide information to the union
'34217 N.L.R.B. 616 (1975), enforced, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976).
t5 Id. 617 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
136 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
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extended to the furnishing of information to enable the union to
decide whether to process a grievance to arbitration. Because one
of the union's functions as collective bargaining representative is
the processing of grievances, the information requested was relevant
to collective bargaining. 3 7
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co..,1 the Court recognized
a distinction between proceeding under a collective bargaining
agreement and filing suit under Title VII, when it held that un-
favorable arbitral awards did not bar subsequent recourse to Title
VII remedies in employment discrimination cases. Courts should
also distinguish between information requests that are made for
litigation purposes (e.g., the Westinghouse case) and those that are
made for collective bargaining purposes (e.g., the Acme Industrial
case). The first section of this Comment demonstrated that the duty
of fair representation should not be extended to scrutinize a union's
decision not to bring a Title VII action, because in so doing the
union does not bind the employee by use of the statutorily-granted
collective bargaining power. If a union decides that it does want to
bring a Title VII action, it likewise does not use its power as collec-
tive bargaining representative. To the contrary, litigation is a con-
scious choice against resolving the dispute by agreement with the
employer. If the employer can prove that the union does not intend
to use the information in the collective bargaining process, it would
be anomalous to force the employer to surrender it on the ground
that it is relevant to collective bargaining.
The difference in intended use is crucial. To the extent that
the union is permitted to use the employer's duty to disclose relevant
information as a discovery device, it will have the incentive to go
through the pretense of bargaining with the employer. Such abuse
of the collective bargaining process should be prevented by allowing
the employer to prove the existence of the improper litigative pur-
pose.
The narrowness of this suggested limitation on the employer's
disclosure duty must be emphasized. Consistent with this limita-
tion, a union could request information for bargaining purposes,
and subsequently decide to file a Title VII suit against the employer.
.
3 7 See also NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (section 8(d) of
the NLRA requires employer to provide union with information relevant and neces-
sary to active bargaining); United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 993 (1971) (providing of information for administra-
tion of collective agreement already in force); NLRB v. General Electric Co., 418
F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
NLRB, 412 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969).
lS 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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When the union intends to use the information for bargaining pur-
poses, there can be no objection that the request lacks relevance to
collective bargaining. It is only when the union intends at the
outset to bypass the collective bargaining process that the request
should be denied. Only at that point should the union be denied
access to information, under the aegis of the NLRB. When litiga-
tion becomes the union's primary purpose, no hardship is imposed
when it is required to turn to the normal discovery procedures af-
forded plaintiffs.
It will be difficult for the Board and the courts to draw the
line between situations in which data is sought principally for the
purpose of bargaining, and those in which the proven purpose of
the request is to facilitate contemplated litigation. A court should
consider several factors in determining whether the union's primary
purpose is to use the information in litigation. First, the court
should take note of the point in the contract cycle at which the in-
formation request is made. In Westinghouse, the request was made
one year into a three year agreement; such timing strongly implies
a purpose other than collective bargaining. Second, the court should
scrutinize the union's behavior at previous negotiating sessions. An
information request following silence at previous bargaining rounds
might support the conclusion that the union never intended to re-
solve the issue through the collective bargaining mechanism. Third,
the court should determine whether similar litigation between the
parties is pending at the time the request is made. Finally, the court
must examine the union's declared policies and objectives, which
may indicate its intentions as to negotiation or litigation. While
no single factor may be conclusive in a particular case, taken together
they provide a useful starting point in this difficult inquiry.
The distinction between the differing effects of litigation and
collective bargaining on requests for information formed the basis
of a recent administrative law proceeding, White Farm Equipment
Co.189 The union therein requested data relating to employment
of minority groups. The administrative law judge concluded from
the facts that "the Union's purpose in requesting the information
in question was not a collective-bargaining purpose (in any sense of
the term as applied under the Act) . . " 140 Rather, it "suggest[ed]
that the Union's purpose was fulfillment of its duty of fair repre-
sentation under Title VII [litigation] . . . .. 141 Accordingly, the
139 No. 9-CA-8835 (region 9, Columbus, Ohio, filed Oct. 3, 1974).
140 Id. 5.
14' Id.
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judge held that the company's refusal to furnish the information
was not a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
In addition to holding that the employer's duty to disclose in-
formation did not require the employer to honor union requests
made primarily for litigation purposes, Administrative Law Judge
Jalette relied on two of the four aforementioned factors in finding
that the "Union's purpose in requesting the information was not
* a collective bargaining purpose." L4
In short, the chronology of events, the Union's foreknowl-
edge of possible discrimination based on sex and race and
its silence in negotiations .. warrant a finding that the
Union did not request the information for the purpose of
obtaining data to fulfill its duty of fair representation by
the negotiation of a new contract, nor to police the ad-
ministration of the contract.143
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined four aspects of the union's role as
Title VII plaintiff. It was first argued that the duty of fair repre-
sentation is inapplicable to a union's decision not to prosecute Title
VII suits; second, that the "results" standard-which creates a de
facto union obligation to bring Title VII suits-is an unsound con-
struction of Title VII; third, that these conclusions are more con-
sistent with the policy preference for orderly collective bargaining
than their rejected counterparts; and fourth, that the employer has
no duty to disclose information when the union's primary purpose
is litigation.
These conclusions do not unduly sacrifice the antidiscrimination
goals of Title VII to the collective bargaining principle embedded
in the NLRA. This Comment has demonstrated that discrimina-
tory access to union-supported Title VII litigation can be attacked
directly under Title VII, and that the "results" standard in fact
jeopardizes the goals of Title VII. Finally, to force a litigious union
to utilize normal discovery procedures can hardly be criticized as an
unduly harsh result.
In summary, the conclusions reached in this Comment are con-
sistent with Emporium-Capwell's requirement that the separate com-
ponents of the national labor policy be construed as part of a
comprehensive scheme.
142 Id.
143 Id. 6 (emphasis added).
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